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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States federalist model, constituent states haven't much
opportunity to irritate foreign nations. They cannot declare war, nor make
treaties, nor assist or prevent immigration, nor offer or deny amnesty, nor pass
legislation that unduly burdens international trade. In short, most state activity
that could touch on foreign relations is insulated from international criticism by
the Constitutional provisions committing such things to the federal government.
One thing states may do, however, is execute criminal offenders who are
under the age of eighteen. This practice puts the states of the United States into
a very small minority on a global scale, and it has drawn the ire of the
international community.
While no pending congressional legislation compels U.S. constituent states
to abolish their death penalties, at least one proposal provides for the federal
government to "urge" states to do so. In 2001, Wisconsin Democrat Senator
Russell Feingold introduced two bills in the United States Senate.' The first
(S. 19 1) sought to abolish the Federal death penalty2 and the second (S.233) to
impose "a moratorium on executions by the Federal Government and urge the
States to do the same, while a National Commission on the Death Penalty
reviews the fairness of the imposition of the death penalty., 3 This National
Death Penalty Moratorium Act. (NDPMA) requested the appointment of a
federal Commission to study the federal death penalty policy. 4 On June 13,
2001, it was referred to the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights for hearings.5
In light of the September 11 th, 2001 attacks on the United States (with
foreign relations issues much on Congress's mind), one might posit that
Congress could pass an Act forbidding states to carry out the death penalty for
fear of the backlash this United States policy invites from the international
community.
When Congress is silent, the United States Supreme Court crafts federal
common law to either approve a state practice by finding it constitutional- as
1. This is not the first time Congress has ruminated upon Senator Feingold's proposals for a ban
on the death penalty. See, for example, the Federal Death Penalty Abolution Act of 1999, available at
http://feingold.senate.gov/issuearea/abolitionbill.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (introduced in the first
session of the 106th Congress as S. 1917) and the National Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, which was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2000. The 2000 bill's status is available on the Library
of Congress' Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress, linked at http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002).
2. 147 CONG. REc. S581 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (bill number S.191).
3. 147 CONG. REC. S923 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (bill number S.233).
4. 147 CONG. REC. S923 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (bill number S.233).
5. Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl06query.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (retrieve updates by bill number).
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it has done to date in the juvenile death penalty6- or sanction a state practice
by finding it unconstitutional, as it did in Brown v. Board of Education.7
Although the Supreme Court has decided a few such cases during and since the
Cold War,8 the Court usually abstains from meddling in foreign affairs by way
of federal common law, preferring to leave such matters to Congress.9
When Congress is vague, the Supreme Court can interpret federal statutes
to incorporate international law standards into a federal common law that
overrides states' domestic policies. 0 In so doing, the Court tries to avoid policy
conflicts with other branches' foreign affairs activities: "[o]ne reason so few
questions of foreign relations federalism get answered is because the Court has
chastened itself to avoid constitutional grounds for decision, including by
construing statutes in order to avoid them.""
But when Congress clearly speaks (in our hypothetical, to say "you must
strike the juvenile death penalty from your state law"), a statutory pre-emption
inquiry attaches: "The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-
empt state regulation [that is] contrary to federal interests."2 A valid
congressional Act trumps state law every time, so a state that wants to retain its
juvenile death penalty laws must attack the Act on grounds that Congress did
not have power to pass such an Act, i.e., that the federal government's interest
6. Erica Templeton, Note, Killing Kids: The Impact ofDomingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile Death
Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV 1175, 1184-85 (2000) (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
7. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See also infra note 114 for scholarly
commentary. But see Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 337, 352 (2001) ("Congress should be given the opportunity to override state activities with which
it would disagree; at the same time, if a fully informed Congress elects not to preempt the relevant activities,
it seems inappropriate to presume that they are incompatible with the national interest.").
8. For a detailed discussion, see Swaine, supra note 7, at 339, n.6 (citing at n.6 Zschemig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968), in which the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional, as applied, an Oregon intestacy statute that imposed conditions
discriminating against East Germans. The Court was famously unclear as to the
precise basis for its concern-- the effect of the state courts' polemical decisions abroad,
their potential for embarrassing the executive branch, or the fact that the state was
attempting to conduct foreign relations-- and why doing any of those things would be
unconstitutional.
9. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 454,
n.361 (1998) (citing, at n.361, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) and
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) as examples of cases where the Supreme Court
abstained from creating federal common law foreign policy, instead deferring to Congress to draft or amend
appropriate legislation).
10. See id. at 449. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (standing for the
proposition that international law standards, when adopted by the United States Supreme Court as federal
common law standards, become the supreme law of the land).
I1. Swaine, supra note 7, at 342. See also the cases Bradley examines, supra note 9.
12. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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is insufficient to pre-empt state legislation. This paper will explore whether
federal foreign affairs concern justifies a juvenile death penalty prohibition and
evaluate the likely fate of states' challenges to the constitutionality of such an
Act.
II. INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. The ICCPR and the United Nations Position
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 3 is an
international human rights treaty, entered into by the Executive and ratified by
the United States Senate.14 The ICCPR provides that "[s]entence of death shall
not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women."'
15
The United States does not comply with this ICCPR provision; it took a
reservation to this part of the ICCPR during treaty ratification. 16 As of early
2001, the United States is one of only six nations in the world that executes
citizens under the age of eighteen years.' 7 Amnesty International reported in
1998 that the United States had executed nine persons between 1990 and 1998,
all of whom were age seventeen at the time of offense. 8
As of 2000, eleven nations "filed complaints [against the United States]
with the Human Rights Commission (the commission in charge of monitoring
compliance with the terms of the ICCPR)" protesting the United States's ICCPR
reservation and the U.S. constituent states' policy of permitting juvenile
executions. 19 Amnesty International has likewise criticized the United States'
ICCPR reservation.20 In 1997, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights itself also obliquely chastised the United States for its ICCPR
13. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter ICCPR].
14. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements,
99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 806-807 (2001).
15. ICCPR, supra note 13, Part III, art. 6, 5.
16. See, e.g., Templeton, supra note 6, at 1192 (citing William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 277 (1995)).
17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY- EXECUTIONS WORLDWIDE
SINCE 1990, at 3 (Nov. 1998) (Amnesty International Index No. ACT 50/11/98). See also 147 CONG. REC.
S582 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) ("The others are Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen.").
18. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 5.
19. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1186.
20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1999 UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS- MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS WORK: TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE SPECIAL PROCEDURES, at 3 (Nov. 1998) (Amnesty International
Index No. IOR 41/01/99).
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reservation: the Commission "[urged] all States that still maintain the death
penalty to comply fully with their obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
notably not to impose the death penalty ... for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age. . ... 2' The United Nations Sub-Commission on
Human Rights "Condemns unequivocally the imposition and execution of the
death penalty on those aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the
offence .... Calls upon also States... to abolish by law as soon as possible the
death penalty for those aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the
offence and, in the meantime, to remind their judges that the imposition of the
",22death penalty against such offenders is in violation of international law ....
B. U.S. Supreme Court Approval of U.S. State Law
An impressive body of scholarly debate has coalesced around the question
of whether the United States Supreme Court should give the international
community's standards of conduct the force of United States law.23 Historical
federal cases such as Chisholm v. Georgia24 and modern ones such as Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala25 support the proposition that the United States Supreme Court is
legally bound by the tenets of customary international law.26 Scholars also
argue that older piracy cases indicate that the United States Supreme Court's
concern for international law standards is specifically recognized in context of
human rights.27
The Supreme Court, however, does not consider itself bound by standards
of international conduct with regard to the juvenile death penalty. During the
late 1980s, the Court set schizophrenic precedent on the issue of whether
international standards should play any role in analyzing whether the juvenile
death penalty passes an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment"
challenge. In 1988's Thompson v. Oklahoma,28 the Court comfortably
21. E.S.C. Res. 1997/12, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 36th mtg., Supp. No. 3, at
70, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (Apr. 3, 1997).
22. E.S.C. Res. 2000/17, U.N. ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm., Sub-Comm. on Human Rts., 56th
Sess., 26th mtg., at 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/17 (Aug. 17, 2000) (emphasis in original).
23. Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26
(1998) [hereinafter Koh, State Law].
24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed 440 (1793).
25. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. Koh, State Law, supra note 23, at 1825-26, n.8-10 (1998). Koh also provides an excellent
capsule summary of the United States Supreme Court's history of incorporating international law standards
into federal common law.
27. Id. at 1826 (citing G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy
Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1989)).
28. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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integrated the international community's majority standard into its opinion.
Thompson, age fifteen at the time of offense, "was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death."29 The Oklahoma statute at issue provided that
a "'Child' means any person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any
person sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age who is charged with
murder."30 The trial court, after a hearing, determined that Thompson could be
tried as an adult.3' This decision was perhaps due to the fact that Thompson
acted in concert with others, as well as due to the evidence surrounding the
victim's death: "The evidence disclosed that the victim had been shot twice,
and that his throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut. He also had multiple
bruises and a broken leg. His body had been chained to a concrete block and
thrown into a river.... ,32 "We have previously recognized," said the Court, "the
relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual. 33 The Court surveyed the policies of
several international States to conclude that "it would offend civilized standards
of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his
or her offense."34
The following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky,35 the Supreme Court eroded
its Thompson holding to announce that "in the United States, the juvenile death
penalty is constitutional as applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-old
defendants."36 Stanford was a consolidated case. Petitioner Stanford was just
over seventeen when he and an accomplice "repeatedly raped and sodomized
[a gas station attendant] ... during and after their commission of a robbery ....
They then drove her to a secluded area near the station, where Stanford shot her
point-blank in the face and then in the back of her head . . . ."" The second
petitioner, Wilkins, was just over sixteen when he and an accomplice robbed a
convenience store. 38 He stabbed the attendant eight times on three separate
occasions, leaving her to die on the floor.39 Both Kentucky and Missouri
29. Id. at 818.
30. Id. at n.2 (citing OKLA. STAT., Tit. 10, § 1101 (1) (Supp. 1987)).
31. Id. at 819-20.
32. Id. at 819.
33. Thompson, 487 U.S. at n.31
34. Id. at 830. See also Templeton, supra note 6, at 1183-84 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988)) (noting that the Supreme Court "emphasized that the views of the international community
are relevant in determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual" under the United States Constitution's
Eighth Amendment.).
35. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
36. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1184-85 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
37. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
38. Id. at 366.
39. Id.
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allowed the petitioners to be tried as adults because of the gravity of the
crimes.40
Considering an Eighth Amendment challenge that the punishment was too
cruel and unusual to pass constitutional muster, the Court noted that execution
of young people was probably not prohibited in the Framers' time because "the
common law set the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit any felony
at the age of 14, and theoretically permitted capital punishment to be imposed
on anyone over the age of 7.,,4I The Court then said any Eighth Amendment
violation would arise from a violation of decency as defined by the values "of
modem American society as a whole. 42 Affirming these two convictions, the
Court specifically rejected Thompson's reliance on international standards: "We
emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention... that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant."
43
Thus, as law of the land exists today, Congress stands silent; the ICCPR is
non-binding; and no other treaty provisions prevent U.S. constituent states from
enforcing their juvenile death penalties. To the contrary, the United States
Supreme Court has formulated a "federal common law" that finds the death
penalty a constitutional punishment when imposed by states on a person under
age eighteen at the time of offense.44 Under Stanford's reasoning, the
international "community's conceptions of decency" matter not at all.45
Im. THE CONCEPT OF INTERNALIZATION
Where the Supreme Court closes a door, Congress and the Executive may
open windows. In the United States, any of the government's three branches
may legally internalize international norms, making them binding on federal
courts.46 "Sometimes, as in the case of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the executive branch takes the lead .... Sometimes Congress
takes the lead, spurred by nongovernmental organizations... [and] in recent
human rights cases, federal courts have taken the lead, but only with the express
40. Id. at 365-66.
41. Id. at 368.
42. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
43. Id. at n.1.
44. See, e.g., id. But see Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1639-1641 (1997) (asserting that customary international law guides most federal courts
in human rights decisions). See also id at 1713 ("[T]hese customary international human rights norms are
based almost exclusively on the very treaties that the political branches have taken pains to exclude from the
domain of federal law.").
45. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at n. I.
46. Koh, State Law, supra note 22, at 1860.
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congressional directives in the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act] and the TVPA
[Torture Victims Protection Act].""
Harold Hongju Koh, in discussing the ways in which a State internalizes
international standards of conduct, suggests four steps along a spectrum of
compliance, drawing a distinction "among four relationships between stated
norms and observed conduct: coincidence, conformity, compliance, and
obedience. '48 A State can move toward "willing compliance" with one or more
internal tactics: a State socially internalizes "international human rights norms"
when " a given standard of conduct acquires so much public legitimacy that
there is -widespread general obedience to it."'49 A State legally internalizes an
international standard of conduct when the standard is "incorporated into the
domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation,
legislative action, or some combination of the three."50  Finally, a state
politically internalizes an international standard of conduct "when political elites
accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy."'"
Koh does not specify whether this governmental policymaking is consistently
formal (legislation) or informal (consistent political practice), but one may posit
that either would qualify.
Assuming arguendo that the forbearance to juvenile offenders is indeed an
international standard of conduct (justified either by common practice or byjus
cogens), any U.S. constituent state's forbearance to do so is only coincidentally
obedient to the international standard, because the Supreme Court of the United
States has given the practice its stamp of approval.52 This places the United
States at the far end of Koh's spectrum because of the wide disparity between
the "stated [international] norms and [the constituent states'] observed
conduct."53
Senator Feingold' s NDPMA represents movement toward "conformity" or
"compliance," because it suggests a formal moratorium on the internationally
questionable conduct.54 Adopting Koh's terminology, our hypothetical Juvenile
47. Id.. The Alien Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was amplified by the Torture
Victims Protection Act (1992), which gives rise to private causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 48 (3d
ed., Kluwer Law International 1996).
48. Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, n.3 (1999) (reviewing ABRAN CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey].
49. Id. at 2656.
50. Id. at 2657.
51. Id. at 2656-57.
52. See generally Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
53. See Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at n.3.
54. See id.
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Death Penalty Prohibition Act would place the United States farther along the
internalization spectrum: it would be a legally internalized obedience to the
international standard of conduct.55
IV. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY PROHIBITION AS A FOREIGN COMMERCE
REGULATION
The first way Congress could legally internalize a national juvenile death
penalty prohibition is through a pre-emptive federal regulatory scheme enacted
under congressional foreign commerce power. Removing from analysis for the
moment the question of Congressional authority to legislate in support of
executive treaty-making power (discussed in the next section), this section will
explore whether Congress could defend a juvenile death penalty prohibition by
claiming that constituent states' policies impermissibly burden foreign
commerce.
A. Congressional Authority over Foreign Commerce
The United States Constitution textually authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations ... ,56 This authority is characterized as
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause power when Congress uses it to limit state
action.57 When Congress acts pursuant to this plenary power, its authority is
limited only by other checks and balances built into the Constitution's text and,
arguably, by the structure of the Constitution itself. Congress cannot, for
example, legislate in "areas beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause," nor
may Congress "commande[er] ... the executive or legislative branches of the
state governments, [nor] overrid[e] state sovereign immunity in either federal
or state court .... "58
In 2000, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council59 laid out the latest
federal pre-emption tests that apply when a state law allegedly burdens foreign
commerce. No standard of international conduct comes into play; the analysis
looks to domestic congressional intent. A state law is pre-empted if "Congress
intends federal law to 'occupy the field' ... in that area. '60 Similarly, "state law
is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute,"'" with
"conflict" defined as a situation "where it is impossible for a private party to
55. See id. at 2657.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
57. See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 7. See also U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
58. Yoo, supra note 14, at 763 (internal citations omitted; cases dated between 1995 and 2000). See
also id at 817-18 for more detailed discussion.
59. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
60. Id. at 372 (internal citations omitted).
61. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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comply with both state and federal law ... [or] where [state legislation] stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 62 To determine whether state law "stands as an-obstacle" to federal
purposes, the Supreme Court will "examin[e] the federal statute as a whole" to
identify the statute's "purpose and intended effects. 63
B. Congressional Concern: The Cost of Non-Compliance
Some human rights treaties, such as the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), provide by their terms that the treaties may affect member
States' internal economic affairs. For example, in the ACHR, member States
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the treaty-created Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and agree to pay such judgments or sanctions as the that court
may impose.' Although this is an economic concern, it is not necessarily a
commercial concern in the sense of transnational monetary exchange.
The ICCPR, as a resolution of the United Nations general assembly, is
subject to the United Nations' charter-authorized enforcement procedures.65 The
United Nations generally eschews strong-arm enforcement tactics.66 However,
when a member State's practice becomes truly offensive to the United Nations'
collective membership, the United Nations Security Council can and will
authorize enforcement actions that may include both non-coercive tactics such
as multinational agreements and coercive tactics such as authorized trade
61
sanctions.
Although some scholars argue that because "none of the parties [to a
human rights agreement] are exchanging rights or benefits... individual states
have no coercive power," 68 the United Nations recognizes that trade sanctions
do impact States' economies, sometimes to the extent that they interfere with
62. d at 372-73 (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 373 (internal citations omitted).
64. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, entered into force July
18, 1978, ch. VuI, sec. 3, art. 68(2), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002) (also known as the "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica") [hereinafter ACHR].
65. See UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UN PEACEKEEPING, U.N. Doc.
DPI/1851/Rev.9 (June 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/peacefct.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2002) [hereinafter UN PEACEKEEPING].
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, IMAGE AND REALITY-
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS (June 1999), at ch. 4, available at
http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/ch4/ch4_txt.htm#q2 (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (chapter entitled "What Does
the United Nations Do for Human Rights and Justice?") (discussing the United Nations's "sustained anti-
apartheid campaign" against South Africa).
68. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1192 (citing William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 277 (1995)).
States' overall economic development.69 The United Nations has urged States
to refrain from taking "unilateral measures ... in particular those of a coercive
nature with extraterritorial effects, which create obstacles to trade relations
among [international] States ... imped[e] the full realization of the rights set
forth in... international human rights instruments."7
Congress will argue that, if an international State imposed a unilateral trade
sanction on the United States in protest to the federal government's failure to
prohibit its constituent states from imposing ajuvenile death penalty, the State's
action would affect the United States' economy as a whole.7 Congress can
easily identify the potential economic impact. The countries objecting to the
United States' ICCPR reservation include some of "the United States' closest
allies: France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain. 72 These States are also major
United States trading partners.73 As of 1999, Western Europe accepted 22.5%
of the United States' total exports, generating United States revenues of nearly
$153 billion.74 Norway alone imported $1.8 billion of United States goods
during 2001. 73
C. The Fate of a State Challenge
To determine whether Congress can pre-empt the state's death penalty with
this rationale, the Supreme Court, upon a challenge, will look to Congress'
purpose: avoiding unilateral trade sanctions and preserving economic
relationships with the identified trading partners.76 A state could argue that a
mere potential for trade sanctions- when no foreign State has yet imposed such
sanctions nor threatened to do so- is not a sufficient federal concern to justify
Congress in forbidding states to enforce their own criminal laws.
69. See Res. 2000/11, U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., 52d mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/I 1 (Apr. 17, 2000).
70. Id.
71. Most NGO reporting in this area examines the effect on the United States economy of sanctions
imposed by the United States on a foreign State- rather than against the United States as suggested here-but
the import-export revenue numbers apply to either situation.
72. Templeton, supra note 6, at n.98.
73. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE DOMESTIC COSTS OF SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN
COMMERCE 30 (Mar. 1999).
74. Id.. See also id at 39 et seq. (discussing and providing statistics on additional "trickle-down"
economic effects of trade restrictions).
75. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 316 (2002) (section entitled "Country Reports: Norway").
76. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at n.17 (implying that the Supreme Court's recognition of a general
Congressional desire to maintain cooperative relationships with allies is a valid rationale for federal
legislation). See also id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is perfectly obvious from the record ... that the
inflexibility produced by the Massachusetts statute has in fact caused difficulties with our allies.").
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If the state was arguing that the juvenile death penalty does not pose a
domestic interstate commerce burden, this argument might succeed.
"'[S]anctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted,
and likely to be ineffective when used."' 77 Domestic commerce power requires
Congress to show some actual effect on interstate commerce, an effect that is
not de minimis. United States v. Lopez78 overturned a congressional gun control
act because the Act was not sufficiently related to interstate commerce concerns.
The government argued that handguns in schools engendered violent crime and
interfered with the "learning environment," and that both endangered the
economy by threatening interstate travel and economic participation. 79  The
Court held that Congress's regulatory power under the domestic Commerce
Clause was limited to concerns with a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce.
80
In domestic commerce clause legislation "Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce,"'" but the Lopez Court refused "to pile inference
upon inference" to find a commerce link where Congress had provided no
record to aid the court in evaluating a commerce effect.82 The Court affirmed
this reasoning in Jones v. United States,83 holding that arson of a private home
could not be prosecuted under federal criminal law. The mere fact that the
home was used to secure an interstate loan and received natural gas from outside
the state did not establish a sufficient interstate commerce relationship to trigger
federal jurisdiction.'
If Congress passed a national juvenile death penalty prohibition based
solely upon its speculation that economic sanctions might be imposed, the Lopez
and Jones precedents would allow- although they would not compel- the
Supreme Court to find that the state legislation should stand until and unless
Congress shows that the state law actually affects international economic
relations.
However, the dormant foreign commerce clause analysis is different, and
the scrutiny of state action "more rigorous."85 First, the test for a state's foreign
77. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at 2635-36 (quoting ABRAN CHAYES & ANTONIA
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995)).
78. 514 U.S. 549 (1994).
79. Id. at 563-64.
80. Id. at 556-57, 559.
81. Id. at 562.
82. Id. at 567. See also id at 563 (discussing lack of evidence in congressional record).
83. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
84. See generally id.
85. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, n.9 (1980). See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 345
(discussing a "market participant exception" to the dormant foreign commerce clause).
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commerce burden is more broad and more vague than the domestic commerce
power. If the federal legislative scheme seeks to achieve uniformity in foreign
commerce relations, it receives judicial deference when it conflicts with a state
statute.86 Second, although the pre-emption rules for matters touching on
foreign commerce are the same as those used in a domestic pre-emption
analysis,87 the foreign and domestic inquiries diverge when the Supreme Court
begins to examine Congressional purpose and the effect of the federal statutory
scheme.
In 2000, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council8 8 illustrated this
divergence. Crosby analyzed foreign commerce clause pre-emption to find that
a Massachusetts law restricting state businesses' trade with the State of Burma
(now. Myanmar) was pre-empted by the federal Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (hereinafter the "Foreign
Operations Act"), which also regulated trade with Burma.89 Even to the extent
that Massachusetts's law did not directly conflict with the Foreign Operations
Act, the Supreme Court found that the law kept the Executive from "working
together with other nations in hopes of reaching common policy and
'comprehensive' strategy" with regard to Burma relations, a power granted to
the Executive by the Foreign Operations Act.90 Crosby did not examine whether
the Massachusetts law had an actual impact on foreign commerce, nor did it ask
the extent of such impact if indeed it existed.9' The mere potential of state
interference with the bargaining power conferred upon the Executive by the
Foreign Operations Act was sufficient to pre-empt the state's statute.92 As
compared to the "show us some record" Lopez test for domestic commerce
power, the "if you can imagine it, you can pre-empt it" Crosby test illustrates
that Congress' foreign commerce legislation receives a higher level of judicial
deference.
Crosby does offer slight hope for states with language implying that a state
regulation that merely "complicates" diplomatic relations might not present the
same danger as a state regulation that substantively restricts federal economic
86. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. See also Japan Line Ltd., et al. v. County of Los Angeles et
al., 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (invalidating California's ad valorem property tax levied against ships of Japanese
nationality, when the ships were owned by a Japanese shipping line, subject to property tax in Japan, and
solely used for interstate commerce).
87. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and D'vmt
Comm'n et al., 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (setting forth a domestic pre-emption analysis); compare Crosby,
530 U.S. at 372-73 (applying the same analysis in a foreign commerce analysis).
88. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
89. Id. at 389.
90. Id. at 382.
91. See generally id.
92. See id. at 382.
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bargaining power.93 Congress has also been known to indulge U.S. constituent
states' foreign commerce goals by recognizing states' wishes and custom-
tailoring international trade agreements.94 However, in light of Crosby's
deferential standard and federal courts' general reluctance to countermand any
congressional foreign policy goal,95 these are dangerously flimsy hooks on
which to hang a state challenge against federal foreign commerce pre-emption.
V. JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY PROHIBITION AS ARTICLE 11 LEGISLATION
The second way Congress could legally internalize a national juvenile
death penalty prohibition is by passing legislation to execute the terms of
treaties and agreements adopted by the Executive.9 6 In this scenario,
Congressional "Article Ir" power is precipitated by Executive power.97 The
Executive cooperates with other international States to formulate United States
international policy, and Congress is charged with promulgating domestic
legislation that supports those policy goals.98
A. The Domestically Intrusive Nature of Human Rights Treaties
The ICCPR, and similar human rights treaties, 99 represent an emerging
trend toward international agreements specifically designed to influence the
member States' domestic laws.' 0 As international States become more
economically and socially interdependent, international treaties and agreements
begin to "resemble domestic legislation in directly mandating norms of public
and private conduct ... [and] the treaty power ... threatens to supplant the
domestic lawmaking process."' 0 ' Two treaties similar to the ICCPR illustrate
this claim; the United States has ratified neither of them.'02
93. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381.
94. Swaine, supra note 7, at 344 (discussing United States negotiations for the World Trade
Organization's 1994 Agreement on Government Procurement and noting that "the US wound up permitting
substantial variation among state commitments, even excluding more than a dozen states from any
obligation.").
95. See supra notes 8, 9. See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 338 (discussing and citing Miami Light
Proj. v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F Supp 2d 1174 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Gerling Global Reins Corp. v.
Quackenbush, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8815 (E.D. Cal. 2000); and Gerling Global on appeal at 240 F3d 739
(9th Cir. 2001)).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. U; U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
97. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45 (noting also the effect of Missouri v. Holland).
98. Id.
99. For a list of treaties see Bradley, supra note 9, at n.29.
100. Bradley, supra note 9, at 396-97.
101. Yoo, supra note 14, at 760.
102. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1187; Yoo, supra note 14, at 807 (discussing treaties that the Clinton
Administration had not ratified at the time of publication).
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),'°3 for example, provides
that "1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
... 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival
and development of the child,"'"' and that "[n]either capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences [sic]
committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . ."'0 Member States
agree to submit regular compliance reports "to [a] Committee, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations."'0 6 Although the CRC creates no
specialized international court and does not textually require member States to
change their constituent states' domestic laws, this Convention "contains a
number of provisions that may be inconsistent with current U.S. [constituent
states'] family law."' 7
Like the CRC, the ACHR also forbids capital punishment for people under
age eighteen at the time of offense. 8 The ACHR is more legislatively robust
than the CRC, featuring a "Federal States" section that specifically provides for
intrusion into member States' domestic policymaking: "Where a State Party is
constituted as a federal state, the national government of such State Party shall
implement all the provisions of the Convention over whose subject matter it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction."'0' 9 The ACHR also admits that
a federalist system might struggle with Constitutional limitations, and it
allows- in fact compels- such a State's federal government to exercise upon
its "constituent units" all persuasive power it can leverage: "[T]he national
government shall immediately take suitable measures, in accordance with its
constitution and its laws, to the end that the competent authorities of the
constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions for the fulfillment of this
Convention." 10
B. Executive as Lawmaker: Sole Executive Agreements
Provisions such as these give the Executive a de facto lawmaking role if
they appear in Sole Executive Agreements. The President, acting alone, enters
into a Sole Executive Agreement,"' which "generally has the same legal effects
103. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 UN. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990 [hereinafter CRC].
104. Id. at Part I, art. 6(1)-(2).
105. Id. at Part 1, art. 37(a).
106. Id. at Part n1, art. 44(l)(a)-(b).
107. Bradley, supra note 9, at 402.
108. ACHR, supra note 64, ch. H, art. 4(5).
109. Id. at ch. m, art. 28(1).
110. Id.
111. BORN, supra note 47, at 20.
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as a treaty."' 2 A Sole Executive Agreement can "trump inconsistent state law"
as long as it is enacted on subject matter that the Constitution commits to
Presidential authority. 13 As discussed in the state challenge section below, this
"invisible lawmaking" begs an inquiry into the proper exercise of Executive
power if such power is used to override U.S. constituent states' sovereignty." 1
4
C. Congress as Lawmaker: Enabling Treaties and Agreements
In contrast to a Sole Executive Agreement, a "treaty" is an agreement
approved by both the Executive and by two-thirds of the Senate." 5  Self-
executing treaties made by the Executive are direct exercises of a
constitutionally authorized Executive power." 6 When the Executive acts, self-
executing treaties become the law of the land, but non-self-executing treaties
need enabling legislation from Congress before they bind United States
courts. " 
17
A Congressional-Executive Agreement is not a "treaty" under the United
States Constitution," I8 because it is "approved by . . . the President and a
majority of each House of Congress."" 9  However, like treaties, these
Agreements may also be self-executing or non-self-executing. 2° They are
generally considered to have the same legal force as a treaty.' 2' The North
American Free Trade and World Trade Organization Agreements, for example,
are Congressional-Executive agreements.' 22
In treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements, most of the
lawmaking role remains with Congress; the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to pass enabling legislation for non-self-executing treaties
and to further the goals of other agreements made by the Executive.'23 Some
112. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303(4) and Reporter's Note
11 (1987); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)).
113. Yoo, supra note 14, at 778.
114. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (finding
unconstitutional an executive order to nationalize private steel mills in support of the United States war effort).
115. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 47, at 19. See also U.S. CONST. art. H sec. 2.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 2.
117. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 47, at 19-20. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. Hl sec. 2.
119. BORN, supra note 47, at 20 (citing RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303
(1987); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); B. Altman Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
120. Id. at 20, n. 105.
121. Yoo, supra note 14, at 759.
122. Id. at 758-59. See also Bradley, supra note 9, at 444 (discussing "federalism concerns" in the
context of NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).
123. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
Miller
also argue that the Senate also retains a significant policymaking role even when
the Executive exercises plenary treaty-making power: "Congressional interests
are often directly represented at the negotiating table. Even when Members of
Congress are not allowed to participate directly in such treaty negotiations, the
knowledge that any negotiated agreement must return to Congress for
ratification necessarily pervades the executive branch's negotiating position." 124
On the other hand, although the Senate has the power to refuse ratification, it
"has little freedom to modify [a treaty's] substantive provisions" when the treaty
is presented for ratification. 125 In either scenario, Article II authority allows
both House and Senate to legislate in areas traditionally reserved to states'
domestic policy when furthering the policy goals of a Sole Executive
Agreement, a treaty, or a Congressional-Executive Agreement.
26
D. Congressional Concern: Policy Implications of Human Rights Treaties
1. Concern for Cohesive Human Rights Agenda
In defending a juvenile death penalty prohibition enacted as part of an
Article II policy initiative, Congress will argue that the prohibition must be
federally enforced against U.S. constituent states, because an international State
simply cannot advance a human rights policy agenda without interfering with
actions historically considered domestic. 127 "Human rights violations usually
take place within a nation's territory and usually involve a nation's own
citizens. But as these purely 'domestic' acts take on international legal and
political significance, they too implicate foreign relations."'' 28 Congress will
argue that a human rights policy agenda- as opposed to, for instance, an
economic policy agenda- necessarily controls the treatment of individuals, and
to the extent that such control used to rest in the hands of constituent states, it
must now become federal control to further a greater good. 129 "The usual
explanation for the federal privilege is that national power is required to resolve
collective action problems. Foreign policy often looks like a public
good ....
or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8.
124. Koh, State Law, supra note 23, at 1854 (internal citations omitted).
125. Yoo, supra note 14, at 847.
126. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45 (noting also the effect of Missouri v. Holland).
127. See id. at 453 (discussing a "demonstrable need" for transnational cooperation in setting
standards for human rights).
128. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1673.
129. See id.
130. Swaine, supra note 7, at 343.
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2. Concern for International Public Opinion
Senator Feingold's arguments in support of federal death penalty abolition
included low deterrent value, potential for equal protection violation, risk of
erroneous execution, and- germane to this section- concern over international
public opinion and the United States's global reputation. 131 Decrying the death
penalty in general, Senator Feingold expressed special concern over the
international public reaction to the United States' juvenile death penalty:
Courtesy of the Internet and CNN International, the world observes,
perplexed and sometimes horrified, the violence in our nation ....
Even China--the country that many members of Congress, including
myself, have criticized for its human rights abuses--apparently has the
decency not to execute its children. This is embarrassing. Is this the
kind of company we want to keep? Is this the kind of world leader
we want to be? ... [N]o one can reasonably argue that.., executing
child offenders is a normal or acceptable practice in the world
community. And I don't think we should be proud of the fact that the
United States is the world leader in the execution of child
offenders. 132
When all entities involved in creating a standard accept that standard, the
entity that "defies" the norm loses face in the eyes of its peers. 33 Templeton
asserts that if the United States continues to allow the juvenile death penalty,
"[c]osts to the United States will include loss of leadership and prestige...
[and] disrespect for international law. . . ."t31 Specifically, if the United States
shows no intention of enforcing treaties such as the ICCPR against its own
states, it will be hard-pressed to explain why its initial participation in the
human rights treaty-making process is anything more than pro forma ink-
spreading. 135 At best, this could make other negotiations uncomfortable for the
131. See generally 147 CONG. REC. S581 et seq. (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
132. 147 CONG. REC. S582 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
133. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 48, at 2639 (discussing and citing ABRAN CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 120 (1995)).
134. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1215.
135. id. at 1187 (noting that although the United States has actively participated in drafting both the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the American Convention on Human Rights, it has not yet ratified
either treaty). See also Norman Dorsen, Civil Liberties, National Security and Human Rights Treaties: A
Snapshot in Context, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 143, 153 (1997) ("[T] he United States has not taken
appropriate steps to ensure its own compliance with the international human rights treaties that it has ratified,
and this diminishes its authority in speaking to others.").
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* Executive; at worst, it could result in a loss of allies' trust and an associated
reluctance to enter into other agreements with the United States.'36
3. Concern for National Security
Congress could also characterize a national juvenile death penalty
legislation as part of a national security agenda rather than- or in addition to-
a human rights agenda that simply calls for "collective action.' 37
In the context of formal military security, it is difficult if not impossible to
imagine the United Nations authorizing peacekeeping forces to convene on a
Kentucky courthouse. Although the United Nations technically has authority
to attempt such action, the imagination is further challenged in light of the facts
that 1) United States contributions comprise twenty-five percent of the United
Nations' annual budget,'38 2) United States contributions comprise over thirty
percent of the United Nations' peacekeeping budget,'39 and 3) as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, the United States can veto any
proposed peacekeeping operation.14°
If official sanction by the United Nations is beyond the reach of reasonable
imagination, however, terroristic retaliation by a rogue State certainly is not. "If
one state's activities raise hackles in a foreign country, that country may
retaliate in a way that affects other states.' 14 1 "Costs to the United States will
include . . .endangerment of U.S. citizens . ,,I42 In the wake of the
September 1 lth, 2001 attacks on the United States, such claims hardly need the
support of examples; "[e]ven the most exquisitely targeted retaliation has
spillover effects."143 The 1995 United States Oklahoma City bombing took 168
lives, and insurance claims alone totaled an estimated $125 million.' 44 The
insurance industry similarly reported a $510 million impact from the 1993
136. See supra note 76(discussing the Supreme Court's recognition in Crosby that a desire to
preserve allied relationships is a valid Congressional concern).
137. Bradley, supra note 9, at 453.
138. UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N.
Doc. DPI/1753/Rev.17 (June 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/setting.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2002) ("The top seven contributors to the UN are the USA (25%); Japan (17.98%); Germany (9.63%);
France (6.49%); Italy (5.39%); the United Kingdom (5.07%); and Russia (2.87%). Collectively, they account
for more than 72% of the regular UN budget.").
139. Id.. But see UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 65(noting that the United States owes the United
Nations over $1 billion on its peacekeeping share assessment).
140. UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 65.
141. Swaine, supra note 7, at 343.
142. Templeton, supra note 6, at 1215.
143. Swaine, supra note 7, at 344.
144. CNN.com Europe, Insurance claims to reach billions, Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/09/l2/ins/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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United States World Trade Center bombing.'45 From the September 2001
United States World Trade Center attacks, insurance claims are expected to
exceed $775 million for insurance companies in the United States and
worldwide; 146 United States airlines anticipate an industry-wide loss of at least
$2 billion in consumer dollars; 147 and publicly traded stocks on every worldwide
have struggled to regain their post-attack financial positions. 141
E. The Fate of a State Challenge
1. Attacks on Congress's Rational Basis
a. On the Need for a Cohesive Human Rights Agenda
A state can invoke precedent to argue that a mere Congressional
preoccupation with "speaking with one voice" in foreign affairs policy does not
override a Constitutional protection as fundamental as states' rights to maintain
their own criminal laws.' 49  In the same vein, a state can note that the
participation of all three federal branches in foreign affairs policymaking
already counteracts the "speak with one voice" argument in favor of
nationalizing all foreign relations. 50 However, Congress can counter-argue that
these precedents primarily apply in pre-emption cases where Congress stands
silent, and that when Congress has actively legislated, the "one voice"
broadcasts at a much higher volume to override states' domestic law.'
51
b. On Concern for International Public Opinion
If a state tries to challenge Congress' concern for international public
opinion as a legislative basis, it should note that the Supreme Court already
believes that "public opinion [is] an appropriate factor" to consider in
constitutional analysis. 152 The only real argument a state could pose in this




148. BBC News, Markets return to pre-attack levels, Oct. 12, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1594000/1594438.stm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
149. See Swaine, supra note 7, 338, n. I (citing Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S.
298, 303 (1994) to observe that the "one voice" justification was not enough to trigger dormant foreign
commerce clause pre-emption).
150. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45.
151. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381 (discussing uniformity when a Congressional Act has been passed).
Compare Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434 (invalidating California's ad valorem property tax with a "one voice"
analysis).
152. James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 1039, 1086 (1993) (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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than domestic, public opinion. The state will cite in its support Stanford,
wherein the Supreme Court clearly stated that it did not care to invite other
countries' standards of morality into federal common law vis-t-vis the
constitutionality of a juvenile death penalty.'53
However, Stanford merely reflected the Supreme Court's refusal to
incorporate international "conceptions of decency"'154 into an Eighth
Amendment analysis. Stanford does not indicate that the Supreme Court would
find irrational a congressional record indicating that Congress has chosen to
consider international public opinion. The Supreme Court holds no grudge
against public opinion per se: it has itself weighed international public opinion,
particularly during the Civil Rights era when federal amicus briefs argued that
international disapproval of the United States' apartheid customs were
interfering with the Executive Department's ability to conduct foreign affairs. 155
Further, nothing in Supreme Court precedent indicates that Congress would
be considered irrational for relying on policy recommendations that come from
scholars and sources outside United States borders.'56 United Nations
authorities have made their opinions on the juvenile death penalty quite clear. '57
If Congress chooses to consider these standards and incorporate them against
constituent U.S. states through legislative channels, the Supreme Court might
well shrug at a state challenge and conclude voxpopulii vox dei. 1
58
c. On.Concern for National Security
A state can argue that Congress is irrational to concern itself with the
possibility of formal UN-authorized military action against the United States,
simply because international political realities make that scenario so far-fetched.
Similarly, a state can argue that while Congress is rational to concern itself with
rogue state retaliation, such concessions would fly in the face of the United
States very public commitment itself to a zero-tolerance policy for terroristic
pressures."' These arguments are sound, but in light of Congress' reaction to
153. Stanford, 492 U.S. at n.1.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 152, at 1106-1107 (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294(1955)). See also PAUL BREST ETAL., PROCESS OFCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING-CASES AND
MATERIALS 739-40 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the role of Cold War international public opinion in the Brown
decision).
156. Wilson, supra note 152, at 1085 (discussing the treatment of scholarly work and legal
commentary in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
157. See supra notes 21, 22.
158. See Wilson, supra note 152, at 1085 (discussing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and
quoting Justice Powell's dissent: "The assessment of popular opinion is essentially a legislative, not ajudicial,
function.").
159. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TERRORIST THREATS AGAINST AMERICA,
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the September 2001 attacks, 160 the current political climate, and the Supreme
Court's history of deferring to Congress' national security legislation, the
Supreme Court might not care to publicly agree that any Congressional
legislation reflecting a national security concern is irrational. When Congress
invokes "national security" as its rational basis for federal legislation, the Court
may invoke standing, mootness, or ripeness concerns to justify abstention from
decision. 161 It may employ a "balancing test" that often balances in favor of the
asserted national security concern. 162 Or it may simply decline to examine the
issue at all; the Supreme Court exercises a "virtually unlimited judicial
deference to the government" in cases touching on national security. 63
2. Tenth Amendment State Sovereignty Argument
In 1920, the Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland,'64 set the tone for
Congressional control of state action touching on international relations. "Prior
to [Missouri v. Holland] . . . it was at least unclear whether the Tenth
Amendment restricted the national government's treaty power,"'165 but the
Supreme Court made the issue quite clear: the Tenth Amendment fell to federal
foreign affairs interests.
The treaty in Missouri v. Holland, made between the United States and
Britain, provided protection for migratory geese and "agreed that the two
(Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the Committee on
International Relations, Washington, D.C.) (Sept. 25, 2001); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, PRESIDENT
DISCUSSES WAR ON TERRORISM (President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, World Congress Center,
Atlanta, Georgia) (Nov. 8, 2001); United States Dept. of State Counterterrorism Office, Talking About
Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (presenting the United States
Counterterrorism Policy as:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; Second, bring terrorists to
justice for their crimes; Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and Fourth, bolster the
counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require
assistance.
160. A representative sample of the 107th Congress post-attack Public Laws include the Public Safety
Officer Benefits Bill (H.R. 2882); the Victims of Terrorism Relief Act of 2001 (H.R. 2884); the 2001
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States (H.R. 2888); the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (H.R. 2926); The "USA
PATRIOT' Act (H.R. 3162); the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1438); and the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (S. 1447). All these bills and public laws are available online from
the Library of Congress, Legislation Related to the Attack of September 11, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
161. Dorsen, supra note 135, at 147.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id.
164. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
165. Swaine, supra note 7, at 340.
Miller
powers would take or propose to their law-making bodies the necessary
measures for carrying the treaty out."'66 A Congressional Act recognizing the
treaty's terms authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate the
enabling regulations. 67 The State of Missouri lodged a Tenth Amendment
argument that its internal regulations governing migrating geese in Missouri
airspace should take precedence over the federal treaty. 68 The Court concluded
that, even though the federal treaty affected states' rights to govern actions on
state soil (or, in this case, state skies), states had no Tenth Amendment right to
gainsay federal treaty power when the treaty sought to further "a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude."'
' 69
This power survives today: when Congress legislates pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce the Executive's Article II power,
Congress can override state sovereignty even in areas traditionally committed
to states' domestic policymaking. 70 And perhaps that was exactly what the
Court in 1920 sought to achieve: "We might reasonably conclude ... that the
Court unwittingly created a nationalist monster. But the Court rendering
Holland might also (perhaps even simultaneously) be dismayed by the
blossoming of state-conducted international relations and their tension with
national authority ....
A state could assert its Tenth Amendment rights against the broad Missouri
v. Holland reasoning by arguing two rather esoteric points. First, a state could
claim that in light of the political climate at the time of that decision, 7 2 Missouri
v. Holland contemplates a structural "subject matter limitation" on
Congressional legislation, one that tracks the Executive's subject matter
limitation.' 73 Swaine argues that "the President's negotiating function..
warrants the dormant preemption of state activities approximating the
negotiation with foreign powers- but would not extend, for example, to state
conduct concerning foreign private parties, or applying equally to foreign and
domestic parties alike."' 17
4
If this is true, it logically follows that state conduct concerning domestic
private parties would also fall outside of Missouri v. Holland, and Tenth
166. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
167. Id. at431-32.
168. Id. at431-34.
169. Id. at 433-34, 435. See also Swaine, supra note 7, at 340 (discussing Missouri v. Holland's
expansion of federal treaty power beyond "purely international matters").
170. Bradley, supra note 9, at 444-45; Yoo, supra note 14, at 827.
171. Swaine, supra note 7, at 341.
172. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9, at 458-61 (arguing that the Holland decision was made in a
different political context than that of modem-day foreign affairs).
173. Swaine, supra note 7, at 353; Bradley, supra note 9, at 451 ("Holland itself arguably assumed
that there was such a limitation on the treaty power.").
174. Swaine, supra note 7, at 353.
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Amendment protections would still apply to state decisions to enforce the
juvenile death penalty. "These [human rights] foreign relations issues are much
more closely tied to traditional state prerogatives than traditional foreign
relations issues, and decentralization of these matters often serves salutary
ends."'175 Unfortunately, this theory is not widely accepted.
176
Second, the state could seek to distinguish Missouri v. Holland by asserting
that geese are distinguishable from juvenile offenders. The Court in Holland
made much of the fact that the treaty in question was designed to preserve
geese, and if Missouri killed all the subject geese there would be little point in
having a treaty at all. 177 The Court also noted that the geese were "only
transitorily within [Missouri and had] no permanent habitat therein."' 78
Holland is a brief opinion, drafted with an elegant economy of word and
phrase. There is no reason to assume that these qualifying phrases are anything
less than deliberate loopholes that allow a state to argue the fundamental Tenth
Amendment principle "that a State's government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens."'' 79 Constituent states that legislate and enforce
the juvenile death penalty against their own citizens do not, by so doing,
undermine the entire human rights agenda of the ICCPR and other treaties. Nor
do the states seek to control with these criminal laws anything, or anyone, other
than people properly subject to state jurisdiction."' Therefore, the state can
argue, Holland's extension of Article II power simply was not meant to apply
to every provision of every treaty that Congress seeks to enforce.
3. Structural Federalism Argument
a. Supreme Court Precedent
Assuming arguendo that neither argument works and that the Tenth
Amendment lies crushed under the wheels of Missouri v. Holland, structural
federalism itself protects states' rights to flirt with international disapproval by
enforcing their own criminal laws.' 8' If Congress forbids such enforcement
175. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1714.
176. Bradley, supra note 9, at 451.
177. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
178. Id.
179. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1996).
180. The jurisdictional and prudential questions surrounding enforcement of these laws against a
citizens of foreign States who commit crimes in the United States are beyond the scope of this paper.
181. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 769-71 (rebutting the proposition that the Necessary and Proper
Clause leaves Congress largely unchecked in this area with the proposition that state sovereignty curbs the
constitutionality of legislation enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause). Cf Swaine, supra note
7, at 344 ("[T]he availability of plenary national foreign affairs authority substantially rebuts any such claim,
since (so far as we know) it may be exercised without regard to limits on domestic authority.").
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pursuant to the ICCPR or another ratified human rights treaty, the state will find
itself arguing against the scope of plenary Executive power, because Congress
is acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enforce the Executive's
Article II prerogatives.
8 2
The state can argue that under a separation-of-powers doctrine (as
distinguished from the "subject matter limitation" proposed in the Tenth
Amendment analysis above), Congress may not use its Article II power to effect
against states an action that the Executive alone could not effect.'83 This is a
high hurdle to leap because of the Executive's broad foreign affairs power, but
there is some helpful case law for the state.
First, dicta in the "Pentagon Papers" case implies that the Supreme Court
finds some constitutional protections to be fundamental to "the very foundation
of constitutional government."'" The Court refused to enjoin newspapers from
publishing government documents, even over government arguments of national
security concerns: "The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in
the First Amendment."' 185 The state challenging a Congressional Act prohibiting
the death penalty can argue that even if Missouri v. Holland overrides the Tenth
Amendment, the Constitution's structure- i.e., the very fact that it provides for
state sovereignty and a check-and-balance system-is at least as "fundamental"
as the First Amendment. However, because the "Pentagon Papers" case is only
a plurality decision, and because at least one Justice believed that Congressional
legislation itself denied the Executive this injunctive power,186 a state might not
want to rely too heavily on this case when challenging a congressional Act.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 187 gives a state better ammunition for its
argument. There, the Supreme Court considered, and rejected as
unconstitutional, an Executive Order that sought to nationalize steel mills in the
interest of preventing a labor strike and ensuring a source of steel supply for the
war effort. 88 The state can cite Youngstown's holding that "[i]n the framework
of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."' 189 The state can argue
182. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
183. See Wilson, supra note 152, at 1114 (discussing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952)). See also Yoo, supra note 14, at 839-840 (discussing the Framers' textual decision to
enumerate certain powers in Article I and others in Article II, with the effect of restricting most lawmaking
functions to Congress rather than the Executive, even when the Executive acts pursuant to plenary power).
184. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365).
185. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 744 (Marshall, J., concurring).
187. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
188. Id. at 582-83.
189. Id. at 587. ,
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that an Executive treaty that binds the federal government to promulgate certain
federal laws and influence state laws- as does the ACHR, with its "Federal
States" section- represents a lawmaking function, and one beyond Presidential
power. If the Executive exceeded Article II power in signing the treaty,
Congress's enabling legislation for that same treaty is neither necessary nor
proper.' 90
Finally, a state can argue a compelling prudential consideration in favor of
a structural federalism check: even if neither the Constitution nor precedent
outright prohibits Congress from passing a national juvenile death penalty
prohibition, the Supreme Court's blessing on such an Act would open the door
to a cascade of nationalist powers neither intended nor desired by the Framers.
Lopez recognizes this possibility and firmly decides against such an expansion
of federal power.' Jones, while its language is not as compelling as that of
Lopez,192 cements Lopez in Supreme Court jurisprudence by following its
general anti-nationalist tone.
b. History of Congressional Deference
Although Congressional goodwill is not legally binding, a state can argue
that Congress' history of deference to states' rights in the context of human
rights treaties evinces a general belief among the political branches that the
Constitution protects a state's right to enforce its own criminal laws. '9'
"Political branches ...often choose to protect state interests over foreign
relations interests when the two appear to clash ... a variety of international
human rights treaties.., create numerous potential conflicts with state law."' 194
190. Congress could, however, authorize the President to sign such a treaty as part of the
Congressional lawmaking function. See id at 585.
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road ... but we
decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude ... that
there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local
.... This we are unwilling to do.
(internal citations omitted).
192. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-58 (following Lopez in its unwillingness to construe a Federal statute to
criminalize state activity on basis of the Commerce power, but implying that if Congress had clearly spoken
the result might be different).
193. See Yoo, supra note 14, at 807-08 ("Some human rights agreements have languished in the
Senate for up to 30 years .... Senate leaders opposed several of these treaties because of the concern that
they require more expansive individual rights than those in the Constitution.").
194. Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1675. See also Bradley, supra note 9, at 444 (discussing
deference).
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When the Senate ratifies treaties that affect domestic law, it usually attaches to
the ratification a set of "reservations, understandings, and declarations ... that
limit the treaties' effect on domestic law."' 95 Some human rights treaties invite
legislative "overlap and conflict ...at the state level."'96 The ICCPR in
particular triggers Congressional concern because its provisions seek to override
state law. 197 The ACHR and CRC, as discussed above, threaten to do the same
if ratified. When the United States established its reservation to the ICCPR, it
clarified that part of its reason for doing so was to retain "the constitutional
balance of authority between State and Federal governments." '198 Although
certainly the Senate can decide to ratify those treaties, the state can assert (albeit
a bit hyperbolically) that rejecting this deference to states' rights- a move that
fundamentally calls into question the United States' three-pronged
governmental system as a whole- might harm the United States' international
image even more than would the irritating practice of executing juvenile
offenders.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Congress adopts the international majority's standard against executing
juvenile offenders, internalizes that standard with an Act that enables a treaty
or stands alone under Congressional foreign commerce power, and supports its
decision with a congressional record that shows a rational basis for the Act a
state will have a hard time challenging such action on any clearly-established
legal or constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court, considering such a
challenge, can choose to follow one of two paths. It can find that that the United
States federalist model must shift to accommodate the United States' greater
role as a global citizen-State. Under that rubric, the Supreme Court could easily
decide that Congress' reach in pursuit of that goal extends to tinkering with
states' criminal laws.
Conversely, the Court can support the state legislation in favor of a greater
concern for states' interest in promulgating their own criminal laws. Although
the Constitution does commit most federal affairs to the nationalist agenda,
"[plerhaps states need to be recognized as not just the objects of customary
international law, but also as its subjects, and acknowledged as potential
contributors to its norms."' 99 And while "[s]tate initiatives to protect human
195. Bradley, supra note 9, at 428 (1998). See also Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1675 (making the
same point).
196. Bradley, supra note 9, at 397 (1998). See also Dorsen, supra note 135, at 152-53 (discussing
the overlap in the context of individual civil rights).
197. See Goldsmith, supra note 44, at n.235.
198. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-23, at 18-19 (1992)).
199. Swaine, supra note 7, at 354.
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rights in places like South Africa and Burma are striking in part because they
seem unlikely,"2" that is no reason to exclude states-qua-states from the arena
of international human rights initiatives. Perhaps U.S. constituent states are
willing to become active and educated participants in the international juvenile
death penalty debate. If so, a Supreme Court decision approving a
Congressional fiat that not only extinguishes states' laws but also excludes
states from further participation in the internalization process is both
unnecessarily patriarchal and a dangerous precedent.
200. Id. at 343.
